Lo psicodramma della Banca Centrale Europea e la sindrome tedesca. Alcune considerazioni sul ruolo della BCE alla luce della sentenza del Bundesverfassungsgericht sulla legittimità delle OMT

By decision of 7 February 2014, the German Constitutional Court (BVG) has referred to the European Court of Justice the decision on the legality of the plan OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions), adopted in September 2012 by the European Central Bank to counter the risk of a breakup of the euro. The BVG considers the OMT an act of economic policy, not monetary policy, thus exceeding the powers granted to the ECB by the Treaties. It is unimportant for the purposes of the BVG (restore the chain transmission of money), but its primary direct effect ( the reduction in the spread of some states). The German Court would be willing to accept the plan OMT if it were subjected to limitations in the size of the interventions and the impact on financial markets and whether the ECB was granted the status of a secured creditor. The reconstructions of the rules and the events raised in the judgment of the BVG provide the opportunity to carry out some reflections on the floor of the interpretation of the fundamental rules of the European Union, as well as the role played by the ECB in resolving the Eurozone crisis

L’arma della “golden share” tra giurisprudenza comunitaria ed evoluzione normativa interna

In its ruling of March 26, 2009 (Case C- 326/07), the Italian rules on “golden share”, originally contained in Decree-Law of 31 May 1994, n. 332, ratified with amendments by Law 30 July 1994, n. 474, was declared by the Court contrary to the provisions of the EC Treaty, as deemed to restrict the free movement of capital (art. 56) and freedom of establishment (art. 43). Having traced the most significant passages that emerges from the conceptual cited above, the Author attempts a reinterpretation of this reform varied set of rules. The intent is to emphasize that the intervention of the Court, both with regard to the Italian case as principal with regard to other legal systems of Member States, seems to focus mainly on formal aspects rather than on structural situations, focusing on the effects rather than the causes and which does not examine the degree of development of privatization, or even the fact of their launch

La “golden share” nella giurisprudenza comunitaria: criticità e contraddizioni di una roccaforte inespugnabile

In its ruling of March 26, 2009 (Case C- 326/07), the Italian rules on “golden share”, originally contained in Decree-Law of 31 May 1994, n. 332, ratified with amendments by Law 30 July 1994, n. 474, was declared by the Court contrary to the provisions of the EC Treaty, as deemed to restrict the free movement of capital (art .56) and freedom of establishment (art. 43). Despite the apparent corporate nature, the Court has reduced the special powers granted to the state in privatized companies among the means of limiting or discouraging direct investment and thus the free movement of capital. It has thus laid down the fundamental incompatibility with the rules of the Treaty, once again by applying these principles in relation to the limitations of direct access to secure areas. Having traced the most significant passages that emerges from the conceptual cited above, the author attempts a reinterpretation of this reform varied set of rules, exceptions to those general corporate law ordinarily applicable, highlighting how both however, formed a large European Court of Justice in subjecta materia. The intent is to emphasize that the intervention of the Court, both with regard to the Italian case as principal with regard to other legal systems of Member States, seems to focus mainly on formal aspects rather than on structural situations, focusing on the effects rather than the causes and which does not examine the degree of development of privatization, or even the fact of their launch. After noting the excessive schematic of the rulings of the Court, it is suggested, therefore, not sought in anticipation of the golden share a case of incompatibility end in itself, but to explore case-by-case the anomaly of its exercise. In conclusion, following an attempt to redraw the boundaries of “virtuous golden share”, the attention then focuses on the identification of some plant regulatory reform proposals, with the dual aim of denationalization of the attitude of the internal market Italian and mitigate the extent of the institution of “golden share”, considered somewhat “deviant” from general law

Una rilettura critica dell’istituto della “ricapitalizzazione precauzionale” tra scenari ipotetici, vincoli sugli aiuti di Stato e (in)stabilità sistemica

This paper contains an analysis of the precautionary recapitalization tool which, in the new european framework for crisis control, gives member States the possibility to provide support to solvent banks with capital deficits highlighted by stress tests, in the event of a serious disturbance in the economy. Financial stability offers european authorities and national governments sufficient scope to determine when to provide aid. However, the use of this instrument is limited by fairly restrictive criteria, especially in the field of State aid. For these reasons, the survey focuses on the negative effects on financial stability that may derive from an excessively strict application of the burden sharing principle. The recent case of precautionary recapitalization of the Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the parallel affair (although with different outcome) of the two “veneto banks” (VB e BPVi) and the resolution of Banco Popular Español, are here examined to test the goodness of the new european rules. To balance the need for the preservation of financial stability, taking into account the interests of competition policy, represents the challenge that the legislator, engaged in the BRRD reform process, will be called to restore credibility to this instrument

Recenti interventi normativi a favore dei soggetti operanti nel settore del microcredito. Caratteri soggettivi e profili tipologici di un modello imperfetto

By the introduction of a specific provision of microcredit within Title V of the Consolidated Banking Law, the legislature wanted to establish to regulatory and operational boundaries for an activities which, although still not very significant in terms of volume, has taken over the recent years - especially in light of the financial crisis and issues related to access to credit - an undisputed significance. Specifically, Article 111 sets out the objective (amounts and ancillary services), subjective (beneficiaries and intermediaries delivery) characteristics and economic conditions (interest rates and collateral) of microcredit; Article 113 defines the framework for supervision of the operators and the market. In particular, the provision of a Supervisory Body dedicated to the fund sums up the desire to stimulate orderly and monitored growth of the market. Waiting for the implementation of secondary legislation, it is useful in this paper make a few comments on the key points that characterize the new legislation and propose some amendments to the existing regulatory framework

I “minibond”: confini (mobili?) delle fattispecie e profili di disciplina

By a series of measures aimed at encouraging companies’ access to alternative sources of funding in relation to the banking channel, the legislator has expanded the opportunities for recourse to the debt market for the Italian non-listed companies, including small and medium size, by the issuance of short-term debt instruments (commercial papers), participatory subordinated bonds and similar securities (so-called minibond). As a result of the new provisions definitional boundaries of the various types of bonds are blurred and sometimes overlapped, with the inevitable uncertainties about the legal regime applicable and the risks of its circumvention. The purpose of this article is to “restore order” in the new regulatory framework in the field of bonds. The proposed analysis intends to operate a recomposition of the systematic framework of the Civil Code overcoming gaps or overlaps harbingers of ambiguity

La crociata dei market regulators contro lo “short selling”. Alcune riflessioni sui possibili interventi di vigilanza a difesa dei mercati e degli investitor

L’inasprimento della crisi finanziaria, innescato nel 2008 dal default della Lehman’s Brhs, ha rappresentato un formidabile banco di prova su cui misurare l’efficienza e l’efficacia della gamma di strumenti di vigilanza protettiva in capo ai market regulators dei principali Paesi L’esperienza della crisi ha confermato che le operazioni di vendita allo scoperto naked – e in generale gli strumenti innovativi per il trasferimento del rischio – sono armi a doppio taglio. Se usate in modo accorto e prudente permettono agli operatori di coprire e diversificare il rischio e possono contribuire a ridurre la fragilità del sistema; se adoperate senza adeguata considerazione dei rischi consentono una moltiplicazione priva di controllo della leva finanziaria al pari di quanto accade con i prodotti derivati . L’evidenza empirica ha dimostrato che non sussiste necessità di una disciplina di carattere permanente per la vendita allo scoperto, né di tipo proibitivo né di tipo informativo, considerato che non vi è evidenza certa di relazioni causali tra l’attività di vendita allo scoperto e fenomeni quali l’eccessiva volatilità e la manipolazione del mercato. Storicamente l’adozione di misure restrittive in tema di short selling n on è risultata utile a risolvere tali problemi e non ha generato benefici superiori rispetto al sacrificio in termini di efficienza dei prezzi che hanno richiesto. Lo short selling si pone, dunque, come un “fenomeno” non da esorcizzare o contrastare, bensì da regolare, assicurando anzi il “livellamento del terreno di gioco”. La proliferazione di strumenti complessi ha reso la distribuzione del rischio più opaca per il mercato, per i regolatori, per gli stessi operatori. In situazioni come queste, la credibilità delle istituzioni è fondamentale per guidare le aspettative dei mercati e dei risparmiatori e riacquistare la fiducia. D’altronde, anche la coerenza nell’affrontare le questioni tecniche è uno dei pilastri su cui si regge la loro credibilità

Il nuovo regime delle Offerte pubbliche di scambio connesse ad operazioni di ristrutturazione del debito

A differenza di altri ordinamenti dell’Unione Europea, in Italia il legislatore non considerava le offerte pubbliche di scambio alla stregua di operazioni da ricondurre nell’ambito della Direttiva 2003/71/CE. Per contro, tali iniziative erano ricomprese nell’alveo della disciplina relativa alle offerte pubbliche di acquisto e di scambio. Con le novità di cui al D.Lgs. 18 settembre 2009, n. 146 (c.d. “Decreto correttivo”) è possibile usufruire del c.d. “passaporto europeo” che permette di promuovere in Italia un’offerta di scambio transfrontaliera secondo le regole previste dalla Direttiva Prospetti e, pertanto, sulla base della traduzione della sola nota di sintesi. In merito la Consob era intervenuta dapprima con una comunicazione interpretativa, poi modificando l’articolo 37 del Regolamento emittenti, da ultimo proponendo una serie di interventi correttivi dell’attuale disciplina con l’obiettivo di temperare gli oneri di compliance per gli operatori pur assicurando adeguata tutela informativa agli investitori

Dal “decreto salva banche”, al fondo Atlante, passando per la bad bank all’italiana. Strategie di superamento del bail-in e di ritorno al bail-out?

During the recent financial crisis, in Italy huge public interventions have not been effected as it is happened in other States. Nevertheless, for situations not of acclaimed crisis, on the contrary of demands of recapitalisation imposed by European standards, case by chance, some new devices of public character have been launched. To them solutions of market are placed side by side represented by the constitution before the Fund Atlas and then of Giasone (a sort of Atlas 2), a second fund exclusively destined to the purchase on NPLs. Purpose of the present study is to appraise if the provisions again mintage can give life to a best institutional and regulation order. You keeps in mind, in fact, that the actual Italian banking problem goes over the specific conditions of the single banks: it is a problem of structure, morphological orders, engineering of system. This makes necessary, therefore, to avoid rigidity, for proportional, gradual and flexible mechanisms, contemplating to valorize the effective and virtuous national experiences, in the respect of the European discipline on the banking crises

Le regole in materia di misure difensive tra vecchia e nuova disciplina dell’Opa

Con il D.L. 29 novembre 2008, n. 185 (c.d. «decreto anticrisi») il legislatore introduce vincoli meno stringenti per le societa` soggette a OPA. Le nuove norme prevedono l’eliminazione della «passivity rule» e della «regola di neutralizzazione». In entrambi i casi e` fatta salva la possibilita` per le societa` di introdurre tali regole nel proprio statuto. Scompare inoltre il limite del 30% previsto per l’autorizzazione da parte dei soci. Del pari, viene meno anche la disposizione secondo cui l’approvazione delle misure idonee a contrastare il conseguimento degli obiettivi dell’offerta debba essere approvata da un’assemblea straordinaria